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Revolt Against or From Within the West?
TWAIL, the Developing World, and the
Future Direction of International Law
David P. Fidler-*
I. Introduction: The Third World and the quest for a post-
hegemonic global order
The literature developing under the moniker "Third World
Approaches to International Law" (TWAIL) critically analyzes international
law in order to promote a more just and equitable approach to the countries
and peoples of the developing world., Mutua described TWAIL as a "broad
dialectic of opposition to international law" that resists the illegitimate,
predatory, oppressive, and unjust regime of international law.2 Gathii similarly
argued that "Third World positions exist in opposition to, and as a limit on,
the triumphal universalism of the liberal/conservative consensus in
international law."3 Opposition to the prevailing system of international law
from the perspective of Third World countries and peoples is not, of course, a
new phenomenon in international legal analysis.4 TWAIL rejuvenates the
* Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington. An earlier version of this article was presented at "The 'Third
World' and the International Order: Law, Politics, and Globalization," Osgoode
Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada, Oct. 13, 2001. The author
thanks Amin M. Husain for his research assistance and the editors and reviewers
of the Chinese Journal of International Law for their comments and suggestions. This
article was completed in February 2003.
I The first academic conference dedicated to TWAIL occurred in March 1997 at
Harvard Law School, at which the participants issued a vision statement that read
in part: "We are a network of scholars engaged in international legal studies, and
particularly interested in the challenges and opportunities facing 'third world'
peoples in the new world order. We understand the historical scope and agenda of
the dominant voice of international law and scholarship as having participated in,
and legitimated global processes of marginalization and domination that impact
on the lives and struggles of Third World peoples." Quoted in James Thuo Gathii,
Alternative and Critical: The Contributions of Research and Scholarship on
Developing Countries to International Legal Theory, 41 Harvard ILJ (2000), 273
n.46.
2 Makau Mutua, What is Twail?, 94 ASIL Proceedings (2000), 31.
3 James Thuo Gathii, Rejoinder: Twailing International Law, 98 Michigan LR
(2000), 2067.
4 See, e.g., Gathii, above n.3, 2067; F. E. Snyder and S. Sathirathia (eds.), Third
World Attitudes Toward International Law (1987), XI (presenting analyses of
international legal scholars who have articulated, criticized, and evaluated the
29
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opposition to aspects of international law expressed by Third World states and
intellectuals during the process of decolonization and attempts to sharpen such
opposition in the era of globalization.
TWAIL is not, of course, the only perspective on the relationship
between international law and the Third World; and this article's focus does
not suggest that TWAIL is representative of Third World views on
international law or the only scholarship in this area worth examining.
Further, skepticism about "Third World perspectives on international law"
has been present for decades,5 and such skepticism would also apply to
TWAIL. The TWAIL project is, however, a high profile attempt to create an
intellectual and political movement in international law that deserves attention
because of the issues it raises and the approaches it promotes.
Scholars working under the TWAIL rubric do not necessarily share
similar political, economic, or ideological beliefs.6 At the heart of TWAIL is,
however, unity in "opposition to the unjust global order."7 TWAIL opposition
to the existing world order is both intellectual and political. Mutua described
TWAIL's three basic objectives as follows:
The first is to understand, deconstruct, and unpack the uses of
international law as a medium for the creation and perpetuation of a
racialized hierarchy of international norms and institutions that
subordinate non-Europeans to Europeans. Second, it seeks to
construct and present an alternative normative legal edifice for
international governance. Finally, TWAIL seeks through scholarship,
contribution of Third World nations to the development of international law);
Antony Anghie, What is TWAIL: Comment, 94 ASIL Proceedings (2000), 39
("The work of contemporary TWAIL scholars builds on and develops the work
done by pioneering third world jurists").
5 See, e.g., Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in
International Legal Discourse, 16 Wisconsin ILJ (1998), 353 ("There is no
coherent or distinctive 'Third World approach' to international law; this appears
to be the conventional view among international legal scholars .... [t]he standard
view expressed is that these disparate strands do not weave together in any sort of
pattern. While for convenience they might be lumped together under the 'Third
World' rubric, they constitute little more than a series of ad hoc responses to
discrete issues. Even those who would admit the existence of a pattern tend to
deny its distinctiveness").
6 Mutua, above n.2, 36 (arguing that TWAIL "does not.., have a specific creed or
dogma"); TWAIL Vision Statement, http://www.als.edu/faculty/jgathii/twail/
twailmain.htm (noting that members of the TWAIL network "may not agree on
the content, direction and strategies of third world approaches to international
law").
7 Mutua, above n.2, 36.
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policy, and politics to eradicate the conditions of underdevelopment
in the Third World. s
According to Mutua, TWAIL scholarship pursues these objectives by being
anti-hierarchical, counter-hegemonic, suspicious of universal creeds and
truths, and open to forming coalitions with other critical projects, such as
critical race theory.9
TWAIL scholars have resurrected Third World opposition to
international law because they perceive it again creates a hierarchy of cultures
that privileges the West, underpins Western political and economic hegemony,
and enshrines as global gospel the values, beliefs, and practices of Western,
liberal civilization."0 TWAIL seeks to (1) deconstruct the use of international
law for creating and perpetuating Western hegemony; and (2) construct the
bases for a post-hegemonic global order.
TWAIL's quest for a post-hegemonic global order is complex and
defies simplistic description. In this article, I examine the conceptual nature of
this quest because grappling with the quest's meaning is fundamentally
important to TWAIL scholarship. In general terms, the TWAIL quest for a
post-hegemonic global order is a quest for a more tolerant world in which the
states and peoples of the Third World escape structural and substantive
marginalization. Mutua argued that TWAIL advocates tolerance by assuming
"the moral equivalency of cultures and peoples" and rejecting "'othering,' the
creation of dumb copies of the original."" Similarly, Gathii asserted that
Third World approaches to international law are "characterized by the
recognition of multiple identities, heterogeneity, and the rejection of
universalist modes of reasoning."12
TWAIL's attachment to tolerance is also apparent in its call "for the
a Mutua, above n.2, 31.
9 Mutua, above n.2, 36-38. Other scholars have noted the potential connections
between TWAIL and critical race theory. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Out of
the Shadow: Marking Intersections in and between Asian Pacific American
Critical Legal Scholarship and Latina/o Critical Legal Theory, 40 Boston College
LR (1998), 372 n.65; Gathii, above n.1, 274; Ediberto Roman, A Race Approach
to International Law (RAIL): Is There a Need for Yet Another Critique of
International Law?, 33 University of California Davis LR (2000), 1534.
10 William J. Aceves, Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal Scholarship: A
Study of Equitable Distribution, 39 ColumbiaJTL (2001), 302 (arguing that "the
'Third World' critique of international law questions the legitimacy of the
international system. To these scholars, the colonial and imperial past of the
international system is perpetuated in the contemporary rules and institutions of
international law").
1 Mutua, above n.2, 36.
12 Gathii, above n.3, 2071.
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full democratization of the structures of both national and international
governance so that all voices can be heard" and its opposition to ('attempts to
confer universality on norms and practices that are European in origin,
thought, and experience."13 Discourse about the quest for a post-hegemonic
global order suggests that scholars concerned about the Third World's
relationship to international law believe that the current global order suffers
from intolerance that harms a great deal of humanity.
TWAIL analysis of international law argues that the West's use of
international law vis-a-vis the Third World embodies various forms of
intolerance, from racism to denigration of non-Western cultural beliefs and
practices to blind faith in liberalism's panacea.' 4 These concerns about
intolerance mirror those of earlier Third World scholarship on international
law.15 International law becomes a lens through which to examine intolerance
in global politics and the search for a more tolerant global order that provides
the Third World with not only space for self-determination but also bonds
with the rest of humanity. The slogan for the quest for the post-hegemonic
global order could be "unity in diversity."16
The quest for a post-hegemonic order is not, however, new. As
TWAIL acknowledges, the search for a post-hegemonic global order
happened after World War II and during the period of decolonization from
the 1950s through the 1970s,17 epitomized by the calls for a New International
13 Mutua, above n.2, 37.
14 See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 Harvard ILJ (1999), 1.
15 Upendra Baxi, Some Remarks on Eurocentrism and the Law of Nations, in: R. P.
Anand (ed.), Asian States and the Develoment of Universal International Law
(1972), 3 (arguing that Eurocentrism in international law "led to the acceptance,
mostly uncritical, of European (and Western) intellectual and socio-cultural
traditions as the invariable, if not superior, frameworks for enquiry. In its most
acute form Eurocentrism has led to needless denigration of indigenous traditions
of the colonized nations. But in its milder and more pervasive form it had led to a
continuing indifference to these traditions even in the scholarly discourses");
Introduction, in: Third World Attitudes Toward International Law, above n.4, 3
(noting that the "struggle of the Third World entrants into an ungracious,
unfriendly, and unaccommodating world community").
16 1 base this notion of "unity in diversity" on Edmund Burke's pleas for "Unity of
Spirit, though in a diversity of operations" in his writings on British policy toward
the American colonies. See Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with America,
in: D. P. Fidler andJ. M. Welsh (eds.), Empire and Community: Edmund Burke's
Writings and Speeches on International Relations (1999), 133.
17 R. P. Anand, New States and International Law (1972), 46 (arguing that "what
has been called the 'geography' of international law has radically changed. ...
[I]he majority in this expanded world community consists of small, weak, poor,
underdeveloped, former colonies filled with resentment against their colonial
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Economic Order in the early 1970s.' s TWAIL scholarship has observed that
this earlier quest failed.19 TWAIL angst about the post-Cold War Western,
liberal hegemony in international law and relations provides evidence that the
prior quest by the Third World for a post-hegemonic order left few, in any,
significant traces in international law or the mindset of the Western hegemons.
The alleged failure of this earlier quest complicates the TWAIL
pursuit for a more tolerant global order. The difficulty of the contemporary
quest deepens when we realize that the hegemons are perhaps more united
than during the period of decolonization. During the Cold War, the conflict
between capitalism and communism divided hegemony along an East-West
axis. With the Cold War over and liberalism triumphant, the hegemons of the
international system share a philosophical unity not seen for many decades. In
addition, the Third World is perhaps more fragmented, co-opted, and
uncertain about what kind of opposition to mount. The Third World
confronts today intolerance of a magnitude perhaps rivaled only by the "age
of Empire."
My analysis proceeds in four parts. First, I look at the previous quest
for a post-hegemonic international order that took place during the period of
decolonization (Part II). Second, I consider the aftermath of the failure of this
quest by exploring TWAIL concerns with the rise of a new hegemonic order
centered on Western, liberal political power, practice, and philosophy (Part
III). Third, I attempt to locate the current quest for a post-hegemonic global
order in terms of a strategy against the alleged intolerance exhibited by the
new liberal hegemony (Part IV). Fourth, I analyze the role intolerance plays in
international law and the implications for the TWAIL quest for a post-
hegemonic order (Parts V-VI).
masters, and needing and demanding the protection of the international society.
The new majority has new needs and new demands and they want law to serve
their needs and heed to their demands. The alteration in the sociological structure
of the international society, it is stressed, must be accompanied by an alteration in
law").
18 GA Res. 3201 and 3202, Declaration and the Programme of Action on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May 1, 1974; GA Res.
3281, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 12, 1974
[hereinafter CERDS].
19 Anghie, above n.4, 39 (noting that very few proposals of Third World jurists for
reform of the international system have been adopted); Anghie, above n.14, 75
(arguing that the effort to create a New International Economic Order failed).
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II. The "revolt against the west": The attempted pluralization of
Westphalian civilization
H.A. Pluralism and the development of Westphalian civilization
The historical use of international law by Western states during the
"age of Empire" to impose political, economic, and legal ideas and practices
on non-Western states is familiar to this journal's readership and does not
need elaboration. Through colonialism, capitulations, imperialism, and the
standard of civilization, Western states built a structure for a global civilization
based on the Westphalian model of international relations developed in post-
Renaissance Europe. By World War II, most of humanity was organized
through a global "Westphalian civilization."20 Westphalian civilization
contains structural and substantive features.
Structurally, Westphalian civilization is composed of sovereign states
interacting in a condition of anarchy.21 For order to be maintained in such a
system, states require substantive rules to regulate their interaction, rules
originally called the law of nations and later international law.22 Because of the
anarchical nature of their relations, states themselves decide the substantive
content of the rules regulating their intercourse. Civilizational affinity informs
the substantive content of the rules of international law. International legal
literature recognizes that the structure and substantive rules of state
interaction in international relations were entirely of Western origin.23
20 On the concept of"Westphalian civilization," see David P. Fidler, The Return of
the Standard of Civilization, 2 ChicagoJIL (2001), 140-146.
21 Christopher Harding and C. L. Lir, The Significance of Westphalia: An
Archaeology of the International Legal Order, in: C. Harding and C. L. Lim
(eds.), Renegotiating Westphalia: Essays and Commentary on the European and
Conceptual Foundations of Modem International Law (1999), 5-6 ("As an event
in the history of international relations the Treaty of Westphalia symbolically
indicated a sea-change in international organisation-the transition to a system of
sovereign states, as sovereigns subject to no higher or competing authority and
conveniently determining the number and character of their legal relations with
each other").
22 Antonio Cassesse, International Law in a Divided World (1986), 9 ("The first
salient feature of international law is that it aims at regulating the behaviour of
States, not that of individuals").
23 Josef L. Kunz, Pluralism of Legal and Value Systems and International Law, 49
AJIL (1955), 371 (1955) ("Our international law is a creation of Christian
Europe"); Anand, above n. 17, 45 (arguing that "even a cursory look at the history
of international law leaves no doubt about the Eurocentric nature of this law
developed by and for the benefit of the rich, industrial, and powerful states of
Western Europe and the United States"); Wang Tieya, The Third World and
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Before the global expansion of European power, Westphalian
civilization was not, however, monolithic in terms of how sovereign states
structured politics, economics, and society. Westphalian civilization evolved in
Europe for at least three centuries before it burst onto the rest of the world
through colonialism and imperialism in the nineteenth century. 24
"Westphalian" comes from the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which scholars
regard as the formal beginning of the modern inter-state system.25 The Peace
of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), a bloody European-
wide conflict between Protestant and Catholic powers that, at the time,
represented "the most devastating European conflict after the barbarian
invasion."26
The Thirty Years' War was, in large part, a war of religious
intolerance between Catholicism and Protestantism. The Peace of Westphalia
gave official birth to a European inter-state system that removed internal
issues, such as whether a country was Catholic or Protestant, from the realm
of international politics.27 Non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other
states was, thus, a structural and substantive component of the Westphalian
system. In short, Westphalian civilization began in the seventeenth century
with an attempt to create a stable structure for inter-state relations that
excluded the nature of domestic politics, economics, and society from being a
concern of diplomacy and the law of nations. Westphalian civilization began
International Law, in: R. St. J. Macdonald and D. M. Johnston (eds.), The
Structure and Process of International Law (1983), 959 ("International law
originated in the west as a product of European civilization"); Robert H. Jackson,
The Evolution of International Society, in: J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds.), The
Globalization of World Politics (2nd ed., 2001), 44 (observing that "there is little
doubt that modem international society is rooted in the political culture and
political thought of the European peoples"). Some scholars have argued for more
diverse origins of international law, including the participation of more than one
civilization. See, e.g., Roberto Ago, Pluralism and the Origins of the International
Community, 3 Italian YIL (1977), 3.
24 For a historical analysis of the pre-Westphalian development of the international
system and international law, see Wilhem G. Grewe, The Epochs of International
Law (M. Byers. trans., 2000), 35-275; Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the
Law of Nations (Rev. ed., 1954), 1-114.
25 Jan Aart Scholte, The Globalization of World Politics, in: The Globalization of
World Politics, above n.23, 20 ("The name is derived from the Peace of
Westphalia (1648), which contains an early official statement of the core principles
that came to dominate world affairs during the subsequent three hundred years").
26 Nussbaum, above n.24, 115.
27 Jackson, above n.23, 43 (noting that a central principle of Westphalian
international society was cujus regio, eus religio-the ruler determines his realm's
religion).
Chinese JIL (2003)
as a pluralistic project,28 ostensibly tolerant of domestic differences among
European states.2 9 Westphalian civilization was intolerant toward attempts by
any European nation to disrupt the balance of power, 0 as evidenced by the
wars waged to prevent one state, such as Spain or France, from imposing its
will on the rest of Europe. Thus, Westphalian civilization began its historical
march as structurally intolerant of imbalanced power among European states
but substantively tolerant of domestic differences within European states.
The substantive tolerance of Westphalian civilization should be
considered in light of the common geographical, historical, religious, legal,
economic, and cultural heritage the European countries and peoples shared.
The tolerance of Westphalian civilization about the domestic affairs of states
rested on a likemindedness about politics, law, economics, and culture.3I
Westphalian civilization's pluralism in Europe was not a pluralism of radically
diverse beliefs and practices. As evidenced by Europe's uneasy relationship
with the Ottoman Empire,2 pluralism in Westphalian civilization was still
Eurocentric.
The French Revolution and the wars it sparked tested both the
28 Jackson, above n.23, 44 (noting efforts of Westphalian international society to
maintain "the pluralist European society of states").
29 Grewe, above n.24, 287-294 (analyzing the development of the inter-state system
after 1648 "in the age of tolerance").
so Jackson, above n.23, 44 (noting Westphalian international society's "anti-
hegemonial notion of a countervailing alliance of major powers aimed at
preserving the freedom of all states"). See also F. H. Hinsley, Power and the
Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States
(1963), 167-175 (analyzing the balance of power in early modern Europe after the
Peace of Westphalia).
31 Edmund Burke captured this shared heritage in 1796, when he wrote:
[Europe] is virtually one great state having the same basis of general law; with
some diversity of provincial customs and local establishments. The nations of
Europe have had the very same christian religion.... The whole of the polity
and oeconomy of every country in Europe has been derived from the same
sources.... From all those sources arose a system of manners and of education
which was nearly similar in all this quarter of the globe; and which softened,
blended, and harmonized the colours of the whole.... From this resemblance
in the modes of intercourse, and in the whole form and fashion of life, no
citizen of Europe could be altogether an exile in any part of it .... When a
man traveled of resided for health, pleasure, business or necessity, from his
own country, he never felt himself quite abroad.
Edmund Burke, First Letter on a Regicide Peace, in: Empire and Community,
above n.16, 315-316.
32 See, e.g., Thomas Naff, The Ottoman Empire and the European States System,
in: H. Bull and A. Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (1984),
143.
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structural intolerance and substantive tolerance of Westphalian civilization.
The other European powers struggled with whether (1) traditional balance of
power politics would suffice to deal with the French irruption; or (2)
intervention into French affairs was needed to restore the ancien regime and
European stability and to destroy Jacobinism as a transnational ideology. This
debate continued after Napoleon's defeat in the different policy positions of
Great Britain-keeper of the European balance of power-and the
continental powers of the Holy Alliance (e.g., Russia), which were determined
not to allow something like the French Revolution to plague European order
again.33 Largely through British influence, Westphalian civilization returned to
its traditional pattern of structural intolerance toward imbalanced power in
Europe and substantive tolerance toward diversity in domestic affairs.
In the "age of Empire," Westphalian civilization turned intolerant of
domestic differences when European states brought non-Western nations and
peoples into the Westphalian system. The imposition of the mechanics of
Westphalian civilization on the non-Western world universalized international
law in the nineteenth century, but it did not completely homogenize the world
in the West's image. Homogenization on Western models made progress in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through the application of the
standard of civilization,4 but Westphalian civilization exploded at its core in
World War I-the structural intolerance of the system leading Europe into the
bloodiest conflict ever seen.
World War I interrupted the homogenization of the non-Western
world, and this process did not get back on course until later in the twentieth
century. In terms of international law, Grewe has written that "[t]he
nineteenth century idea of a society of civilized nations ... did not survive the
First World War as a basis and framework for international law" and that
"[t]he intellectual substance of the international legal community changed
during the two decades of the inter-war period, above all as a result of the
fading away of the civilisational ideology and the indiscriminate extension of
the international legal order to all States, regardless of their race, culture or
geographical location."35
33 Hinsley, above n.30, 199-212 (analyzing the conflict between Britain and the states
composing the Holy Alliance about the nature of the balance of power in Europe).
34 See generally Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization' in International
Society (1984).
35 Grewe, above n.24, 581-582, 581.
Chinese JIL (2003)
II.B. Pluralism, Westphalian civilization, and the Cold War international system
The end of World War II found Westphalian civilization poised on the
brink of great pluralism. The Soviet Union had emerged as a great power
utilizing an ideology that challenged the liberal, capitalist assumptions that
drove the West's prior universal expansion. The former imperial and colonial
territories began to form new sovereign states in a decolonization process that
would continue for three decades, creating new actors with diverse cultural
and civilizational histories and different political and economic interests from
the West. As Linklater observed, "the sovereign state has been accepted by
non-European peoples and there is a basic consensus about the need to
uphold basic rules of co-existence though not to promote any particular set of
moral standards."36 The traditional structural intolerance and substantive
tolerance of Westphalian civilization universalized under the forces of
international politics after World War II.
The "revolt against the West"37 by developing countries, at least as
played out in international law, attempted to expand and deepen the
pluralization of international relations. The pluralization efforts had
procedural and substantive features. Procedurally, developing countries sought
to change the hegemonic process through which international law was
historically made and implemented. The* process of decolonization assisted
procedural pluralization because it increased the number of new, developing
states in the international system.
The creation of many new states changed the dynamics of
international law in two ways. First, these states began to exercise their rights
as states under international law, creating a significant body of state practice
affecting treaty and customary international law that could not be ignored.
Second, developing states became members of international organizations,
such as the United Nations, and began to influence the process of
international law through participation in debates, decisions, and cooperative
activities undertaken in these institutions. Developing countries used their
growing quantitative presence in the international system to try to ensure that
the manner in which international law was made and implemented no longer
reflected only the interests and prejudices of the great powers of the West.
Substantively, developing countries attempted to change the content of
areas of international law so that the rules would reflect their interests and not
just those of their former colonial overlords.38 As indicated above, developing
36 Andrew Linklater, Rationalism, in: S. Burchill and A. Linkater (eds.), Theories of
International Relations (1996), 106.
37 The phrase "revolt against the West" comes from Hedley Bull, The Revolt
Against the West, in: The Expansion of International Society, above n.32, 217.
38 Harding and Lim, above n.21, 2 (arguing that "the newly independent states in
Fidler, Revolt Against or From Within the West?
countries engaged themselves in virtually every area of international law
through their diplomatic activities with other countries and through
international organizations. The strategic aim of substantive pluralization can
be, however, discerned in areas of international law on which the Third
World focused significant attention, namely the principle of self-
determination, the prohibition on intervention in the domestic affairs of other
states, international law on foreign direct investment, international trade law,
the law of the sea, and the establishment of a New International Economic
Order.
II.B.i. Principle of sef-determination
Although self-determination existed as an issue in international
relations prior to decolonization,39 developing countries elevated this principle
in the post-World War II period.40 The emphasis the Third World placed on
this principle reflects, foremost, the desire to rid the international system of the
lingering vestiges of colonialism. The principle of self-determination proved a
powerful legal and moral weapon to push back Western influence and create
political, economic, legal, and cultural space for the states and peoples of the
developing world to determine their own destinies, not destinies determined by
colonial powers and civilizational prejudices.
I.B.ii. Non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states
For developing countries, the fruits of self-determination were the
newly independent states emerging from the former Western empires. The
political space gained through self-determination remained vulnerable because
of the inequalities in power and influence still alive in post-colonial
Asia and Africa argued for the introduction of new legal concepts into the corpus
of classical international legal doctrine").
3 UN Charter, art. 1(2) (stating that a purpose of the United Nations was "[tlo
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples"). See also Antonio Cassesse, Self-
Determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal (1995), 11-33 (analyzing the
historical background of the self-determination principle).
40 See, e.g., GA Res. 1514(XV), Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, Dec. 14, 1960; GA Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 24,
1970 [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations](highlighting the "principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples"); CERDS, above n. 18, Chapter 1
(asserting that economic and political relations among states shall be governed by,
among other principles, "[e]qual rights and self-determination of peoples").
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international relations. As part of the pluralization strategy, developing
countries worked to elevate and reinforce the principle of non-intervention in
the domestic affairs of other states. As mentioned above in the discussion of
the development of international law in Westphalian civilization,41 developing
countries did not create the non-intervention principle, which had been part
of international law for centuries.
Through the efforts of developing countries, however, the principle of
non-intervention was the subject of significant international emphasis. As the
UN General Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations (1970) stated, "[n]o
state or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State....
Every state has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social
and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State." 42
The process of decolonization created, however, an increased
geographical scope for the non-intervention principle, transforming this
principle from a European into a universal rule of international law. By
pushing the non-intervention principle, developing countries continued their
attempts to roll back colonial and neo-colonial interference with their affairs.
The non-intervention principle supported the effort by developing countries to
create room for their own policies to take shape within their territories.
Third World emphasis on the principles of self-determination and
non-intervention represented the utilization of existing international law to
craft a more pluralistic, tolerant international system.43 Although neither of
these principles were original to developing-country thinking, their application
by the developing countries represented a substantive transformation in
international law and relations. Principles of emancipation and political
tolerance of domestic differences previously reserved for inter-European
relations became universal.
41 See text to n.27 above.
42 Declaration on Friendly Relations, above n.40.
43 The use of the principles of self-determination and non-intervention by the Third
World illustrates that it was not entirely hostile toward the system of international
law. As Wang argued, "[a]lthough Third World countries are adamantly opposed
to the imperialistic, colonialistic, oppressive and exploitative principles and rules of
traditional international law, they do not reject international law itself.... The
attitude of the Third World towards international law is very clear: it neither
accepts nor rejects international law in its entirety." Wang, above n.23, 961, 962.
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IIB.iii. International law on foreign direct investment
The developing world's assault on the international law on foreign
direct investment is often cited as an example of the "revolt against the West"
having impact on international law.44 Just as effective self-determination
required renewed emphasis on the principle of non-intervention, the
developing world's substantive pluralization of international law confronted
rules of international law that provided powerful, Western states with
opportunities to intervene in domestic matters of developing states. Unlike
developing-country exploitation of existing international legal principles, the
attack on the customary international law on the protection of foreign direct
investment embodied new substantive ideas that challenged the status quo.
The international legal controversies about the international law on
foreign direct investment precede the "revolt against the West,"45 but the effort
to transform this area of international law achieved greater momentum during
the decolonization period because of the individual and coordinated efforts of
developing countries.46 At the heart of the attack on the customary rules on
foreign direct investment, such as the principles of diplomatic intervention and
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for expropriations, was the
strategy of making economic sovereignty effective. Self-determination produced
formal sovereignty, and the principle of non-intervention offered general
protection for the exercise of such sovereignty. Developing countries
perceived, however, that traditional international law on foreign direct
investment undermined the effective exercise of their sovereignty in the
economic realm by giving capital-exporting states and their corporations the
ability to constrain policy options.
In effect, the attack on the customary rules of international law on
foreign direct investment represented an effort to reduce the significance of
international law in this area of international relations. The emphasis on
"permanent sovereignty" over economic resources conceptually rejected a
significant role for international law in matters of foreign investment.47 Matters
44 See, e.g., Anand, above n.17, 47 (arguing that developing states successfully
challenged international law relating to the responsibility of states); Felix C.
Okoye, International Law and the New African States (1972), 178-184 (analyzing
the contribution of new African states to the Third World's challenge against the
traditional international law on foreign investment).
45 See M. Somarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (1994), 8-12
(reviewing the history of international law on foreign investment prior to the post-
colonial period).
46 See, e.g., GA Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources,
Dec. 14, 1962; CERDS, above n.18, art. 2.
47 One can see the desire to reduce the role for international law in the treatment of
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relating to the regulation of foreign investment should, as a result, be
determined according to domestic law and policy with minimal scope for
challenging such sovereign acts through international law.
This perspective explains the Third World move to replace the Hull
Doctrine of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for expropriation
with a standard that provided the host government more latitude in assessing
the appropriate level of compensation due an investor. Developing countries
were successful in this effort, as reflected by the admission of the United States
Supreme Court in 1964 that international law on expropriation of foreign
direct investment was the source of great diplomatic disagreement and
controversy.48
ILB. iv. Special and differential and treatment under international trade law
The three previous examples focused on efforts made to demarcate
political, economic, and legal space in which developing countries could
determine their own futures. The substantive pluralization strategy did not,
however, stop there. Although developing countries believed it important to
gain, protect, and effectuate their sovereignty, they also understood that
embracing "formal equality" through international law would be inadequate
for the development of their societies. The inequalities in wealth, economic
capabilities, and standard of living between developed and developing
countries were too stark for the Third World to rely merely on abstract
sovereign equality. Developing countries needed help from developed
countries, and they attempted to use international law to create ways in which
such help could materialize.
One area in which special and differential treatment for developing
countries emerged was international trade law under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).49 Adopted in 1947, GATT promulgated rules
foreign direct investment by comparing provisions from the Resolution on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (1962) and the CERDS (1974).
The Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources states that
owners shall be paid appropriate compensation for expropriated property in
accordance with national law and "in accordance with international law."
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, above n.46, para.
4. The CERDS provides, however, that appropriate compensation to an
expropriated owner of property should be paid "taking into account its relevant
laws and regulations," but the Charter does not mention international law.
CERDS, above n. 18, art. 2.2(c).
48 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 429 (1964) ("There are few
issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the
limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property of aliens").
49 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 [hereinafter GATT].
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regulating the international trade in goods, such as the most-favored-nationO
and national treatment5' principles, designed to create a level playing field for
GATT parties. GATT originally contained little recognition that, for most
developing countries, the concept of a "level playing field" was unrealistic and
of limited help in terms of economic development. Formally, GATT rules
were non-discriminatory because they applied equally to all contracting
parties, which as sovereign states had equal rights and duties under
international law. Practically, developing countries were not "equal" with
most of the great trading powers behind GATT's creation and
implementation.
As more developing countries joined GATT, they began to push for
special and differential treatment for developing countries.52 This effort
confronted a legal problem in the most-favored-nation principle, which
prohibits (as a general matter) GATT parties from discriminating in favor of
one contracting party in terms of the treatment of like products imported from
or exported to two or more contracting parties.53 To allow special and
differential treatment under GATT, the contracting parties would have to
relax the most-favored-nation principle. GATT exempted bilateral and
regional free trade agreements from the most-favored-nation principle under
specified conditions54 but otherwise did not include a special regime for
developing countries.
In the 1960s, the developing contracting parties of GAT succeeded
in getting developed countries to agree to special and differential treatment for
trade in goods concerning developing countries. Part IV on "Trade and
Development" was added to GATT;55 and, pursuant to this new body of
principles, developed countries began to adopt general systems of preferences
in the late 1960s and early 1970s that accorded developing countries
preferential tariff treatment. 56 GATT parties enacted a ten-year waiver of the
most-favored-nation principle in 1971 to exempt GSP efforts from the
application of this principle, a waiver the GATT contracting parties made
50 GATT, above n.49, art. I.
51 GATT, above n.49, art. III.
52 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) first
introduced he concept of a general system of trade preferences for developing
countries in 1964. Raj Bhala, International Trade Law: Theory and Practice (2nd
ed., 2001), 1431.
53 GATT, above n.49, art. I.
54 GATT above n.49, art. XXIV.
55 Protocol Amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Introduce a
Part IV on Trade and Development, GATT Basic Instruments/ Selected
Documents (July 1965), 13S/2-10.
56 Bhala, above n.52, 1429.
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permanent in 1979. 57
The developing world's success in embedding special and differential
treatment into international trade law represents another aspect of the
substantive pluralization strategy because special and differential treatment,
conceptually, acknowledged the particular dilemmas many developing
countries faced. The changes made in GATT law and practice constitute a
substantive shift in international law towards basing the application of
important international legal rules on a state's level of economic development
rather than on the traditional approach of all sovereign states bearing equal
and identical obligations under international law.
IIB.v. Law of the sea
Developing countries also had significant impact on the international
law of the sea during the UN-sponsored law of the sea negotiations in the
1970s that produced the UN Convention on the Law (UNCLOS, 1982).58
This effort to influence the substantive content of international law echoes the
developing world attempt to re-conceptualize international trade law in the
1960s to include special and differential treatment; but, in the law of the sea
negotiations, developing countries proposed bolder concepts and rules than
special and differential treatment. Although developing country input featured
in the creation of many new elements of the law of the sea to emerge from the
negotiations in the 1970s (e.g., the creation of the regime for archipelagic
states59), two of the best known substantive achievements of the developing
world in this international legal context are the "exclusive economic zone"
(EEZ)60 and the "common heritage of mankind" (CHM).6I
Both the EEZ and CHM concepts centered on a key problem the law
of the sea negotiations faced-how to allot jurisdiction over living and non-
living marine resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Other facets
of the law of the sea, such as the breadth of the territorial sea and the regime
on the exploitation of the resources on and beneath the continental shelf,
factored into resolving this problem, but the developing world played a key
role in formulating two new substantive legal regimes to deal with two
unresolved resource allocation issues: jurisdiction over (1) living and non-living
marine resources adjacent to a coastal state's territorial sea but not covered by
57 Bhala, above n.52, 1430.
58 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982 [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
59 UNCLOS, above n.58, arts. 46-54.
60 UNCLOS, above n.58, arts. 55-75.
61 UNCLOS, above n.58, art. 136 (stating that all non-living resources in the area
beyond national jurisdiction "are the common heritage of mankind").
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the continental shelf rules (EEZ); and (2) non-living resources on or beneath
the ocean floor in the area beyond national jurisdiction (CHM).
Prior to the law of the sea negotiations, international law, generally
speaking, considered living and non-living marine resources beyond the
territorial sea and not subject to the continental shelf regime to be subject to
the freedom of the high seas, meaning such resources were open for
exploitation by any state. 62 From the developing country perspective, this
situation meant that international law would allow developed countries to
appropriate the lion's share because only developed countries would have the
capability of harvesting such resources on a commercial scale.63 Developing
countries successfully proposed the EEZ concept, under which the coastal
state had, if it desired, the ight to declare its exclusive jurisdiction over
economic resources out to 200 nautical miles from the coast.64 Such a proposal
would benefit coastal developing countries concerned about the vulnerability
existing international law created for developing-country access to marine
resources. At the same time, the EEZ concept was not reserved for developing
countries, making it a traditional "equal opportunity" concept from which
developed states could also benefit.65
The EEZ concept did not, however, regulate non-living marine
resources on or beneath the ocean floor beyond 200 nautical miles from the
coast and not covered by the continental shelf regime. The traditional
"freedom of the high seas" principle essentially meant that any state could
exploit these resources, which included mineral-rich deposits. Developed
countries could, thus, legally exploit these resources for their own benefit,
creating the potential for an exploitation regime that would offer no benefit to
the world's poor countries.66 Instead of this traditional regime, the developing
62 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (1983), 156 (noting that "the
abyssal plains of the ocean beds would, in the absence of any special rules, be
regarded as subject to the freedoms of the high seas").
63 Churchill and Lowe, above n.62, 125 (describing developing-country interest in
the EEZ concept flowing from the desire gain control over resources "largely
exploited by the distant-water fleets of developed States") and 157 (noting that,
under the freedoms of the high seas rules, "the developed States of the West,
which alone could muster the necessary investment and technology, would be the
main beneficiaries of sea-bed mining").
64 Shigeru Oda, Exclusive Economic Zone, in: EPIL (1995), 307 (reporting on
Kenya's introduction of the EEZ concept to the UNCLOS negotiations in 1972
and the support it gathered from developing states). Kenya had previously raised
the concept in the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee in 1971.
Churchill and Lowe, above n.62, 125.
65 UNCLOS, above n.58, art. 56.1 (stating that coastal states have sovereign rights
over the economic resources on the EEZ).
66 Deep sea-bed mining dominated by developed states had two potential
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world championed the CHM concept, under which the resources in question
would be exploited under an international authority predominantly for the
benefit of developing countries.67 The CHM concept proposed to add to
international law not only a novel institution but also a scheme of distributive
economic justice. This approach deepened the substantive pluralization of
international law undertaken by the developing world because it went beyond
special and differential treatment to champion ideas about the management of
global economic resources alien to traditional concepts of international law.
I.B.vi. New international economic order
The EEZ and CHM concepts can be seen as precursors of another,
even bolder Third World effort to reshape international law-the New
International Economic Order (NIEO).68 As Third World emphasis on non-
intervention and attempts to change the substantive rules of international law
in the areas of foreign direct investment, trade, and the law of the sea
illustrate, developing countries' efforts sought to transform the way in which
international law regulated economic intercourse between states. The various
efforts on this issue converged in the NIEO, which laid out an alternative
vision for economic relations between states that stressed strong principles of
sovereignty and non-intervention, national control over foreign investment,
and the need to have economic policy recognize the development challenges
faced by developing countries.69 In fact, one of the key NIEO documents, the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (Charter) represents in many
respects a capstone for each of the Third World international legal efforts
disadvantages for developing states: (1) only developed states had the technological
capability to exploit the resources in the area beyond national jurisdiction; and (2)
developed-country commercial exploitation of minerals from the deep sea-bed
might adversely affect the prices of land-based minerals traded by developing
countries. See Churchill and Lowe, above n.62, 155-157.
67 UNCLOS, above n.58, art. 137.2 ("All rights in the resources of the Area are
vested in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act").
68 A. 0. Adede, The Minimum Standards in a World of Disparities, in: The
Structure and Process of International Law, above n.23, 1021 ("The 'New
International Economic Order' is . . . aimed at achieving more access to and
distribution of the world's riches though legal instruments in which the rights and
interests of all the actors in the world arena are fully protected"). On the NIEO
and international law generally, see K. Hossain (ed.), Legal Aspects of the New
International Economic Order (1980); R. P. Anand, Confrontation or
Cooperation? International Law and the Developing Countries (1987), 103-128;
Jerzy Makarczyk, Principles of a New International Economic Order: A Study in
International Law Making (1988).
69 See CERDS, above n.18.
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outlined above. Table 1 below summarizes how the Charter captures these
previous initiatives in its substance.
Table 1.
Substantive Legal Examples of Provisions from the Charter of
Issue Economic Rights and Duties of States
Self-Determination "Economic as well as political and other relations
among States shall be governed, inter alia, . . . Equal
rights and self-determination of peoples."-Chapter 1.
Non-Intervention "Every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to
choose its economic system as well as its political,
social and cultural systems in accordance with the will
of its people, without outside interference, coercion or
threat in any form whatsoever."-Chapter II, Article
I
Foreign Direct "Each State has the right: (a) To regulate and exercise
Investment authority over foreign investment within its national
jurisdiction in accordance with its own laws and
regulations and in conformity with its national
objectives and priorities. . . . (b) To regulate and
supervise the activities of transnational corporations
within its national jurisdiction and take measures to
ensure that such activities comply with its laws, rules
and regulations and conform with its economic and
social policies. . . . (c) To national, expropriate or
transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case
appropriate compensation should be paid . . . taking
into account its relevant laws and regulations and all
circumstances the State considers pertinent."-
Chapter II, Article 2
Special and "Developed countries should extend, improve and
Differential enlarge the system of generalized non-reciprocal and
Treatment in non-discriminatory tariff preferences to the developing
International Trade countries.. ." Chapter II, Article 18
Law of the Sea "The sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof,
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as the
resources of the area, are the common heritage of
mankind."-Chapter III, Article 29.
The examples described above of Third World efforts to pluralize the
process and substance of international law in the post-World War II period
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are by no means comprehensive, and other illustrations could be analyzed.70
These examples are, however, sufficient to demonstrate that the Third
World's "revolt against the West" in international law involved expanding and
deepening pluralization in international relations and to create, nurture, or
foster rules that would produce more substantive tolerance among states than
had been the case in the imperial age. This attempted Third World
pluralization of Westphalian civilization gave non-Western states the
opportunity to develop identities and transnational solidarity independent of
the views and interests of their previous civilizational overlords. Through such
identities and solidarity, developing states mounted substantive and
determined opposition to the inherited Eurocentric rules and assumptions of
Westphalian civilization.
The Soviet challenge to Western liberalism and capitalism afforded
the developing world structural room for maneuver in its pluralization strategy
because the Soviet Union was a superpower with global reach opposed to
liberal ideology. The Soviet Union provided a counter-weight against Western
power that gave developing countries structural space in which to pursue
pluralization. In other words, structural intolerance to an imbalance of power
during the Cold War worked in favor of the Third World's pluralization quest.
The end result would be, it was hoped, a post-hegemonic order that
recognized the distinctiveness of the Third World's interests and cultures.71
I. The post-Cold War triumph of the West: The attempted
homogenization of Westphalian civilization
III.A. Pluralization lost
TWAIL literature argues that traces of the Third World's "revolt
against the West" cannot be easily located today in international law. TWAIL
scholars question the impact developing countries had during the Cold War
on international law. Anghie's assertion that "the drive by developing
countries to create a 'New International Economic Order' ended, on the
whole, in failure"72 represents an observation on more than one element of the
Third World effort because, as discussed above, the NIEO embodied the
substantive and procedural thrust of the "revolt against the West." Although
not all scholars of the Third World's relationship with international law would
agree with such TWAIL pessimism, for purposes of this article it is necessary
70 For a broader analysis of quantitative and qualitative impact on international law
by developing countries, see Wang, above n.23, 955-976.
71 Anand, above n.17, 48-52 (discussing the importance and influence of cultural
differences to and on international law).
72 Anghie, above n.14, 75.
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to explore briefly where the procedural and substantive pluralization efforts of
developing countries in the Cold War period stand today.
As argued above, efforts at procedural pluralization by developing
countries sought to ensure that the way in which international law was created
and operationalized would reflect more than the interests of the Western great
powers. In the post-Cold War period, a frequently heard complaint is that
effective participation by developing countries in international politics is
lacking. The complaint has been acute in the realm of international
economics, a key area targeted in the "revolt against the West." Analysis of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and international financial institutions,
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
frequently mentions the problem of the Third World's lack of effective
participation.
In connection with the WTO, Bhala argued that Third World
countries face a "[n] ear impossibility of effective participation":
Even if Third World WTO members comprehended and fully
implemented the legal agreements from the previous trade round,
they could hardly be expected to keep up with the pace of activity at
the WTO. Indeed, they have virtually no say over that pace. The key
WTO members, in terms of setting agendas and priorities, organizing
meetings, formulating positions, and so forth, are the usual suspects.
Many developing countries cannot participate fully in WTO affairs as
structured by members like the United States.3
The lack of effective participation by developing countries in the
implementation of WTO agreements undermines the continued, and even
expanded, presence of special and differential treatment for developing
countries found in the Uruguay Round agreements. In other words, the
success the Third World had embedding special and differential treatment for
developing countries as a substantive principle in GATT has survived and
even multiplied in the WTO agreements. 74 Despite the formal success of the
special and differential approach, questions remain about whether the
international trading system, as modified to acknowledge the needs of
developing countries, has produced the benefits promised for the Third
73 Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islam, and Doha: Unmet Challenges Facing American Trade
Law, 36 International Lawyer (2002), 171.
74 For an analysis of special and differential treatment in the agreements of the
WTO, see Raj Bhala, Trade, Development, and Social Justice (2003)
(forthcoming).
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World.7s
The seriousness of the Third World's troubled relationship with
international trade law of the WTO appears in the decision to focus the next
round of trade liberalization talks on Third World development--the so-
called Doha Development Agenda.76 Although it is too early to judge whether
the next round of negotiations will advance the economic development of
developing countries, pessimism is in the air. Reflecting on this atmosphere,
Bhala noted that "a poor country might well view the Doha result not so
much as a success, but as an extension of the Ancient Greek Melian Dialogue
to international trade relations: that the strong do what they do, and the weak
suffer what they must." 77
Experts have voiced similar sentiments on the lack of procedural
pluralization in connection with the World Bank and IMF. With regard to
these international financial institutions, Woods argued that "decision-making
processes have remained the same and rely on a hierarchy which reflects fifty-
year-old inequalities" and still require fundamental changes that would
produce "greater legitimacy, and a greater degree of representation and
participation . . . which is unlikely given the persistence of the old
hierarchy."7T As I observed elsewhere, the World Bank's and IMF's power "is,
by and large, controlled by the same group of 'civilized' powers that were
responsible for the creation of the multilateral system of capitulations-the
European countries and the United States."79
The quantitative advantage decolonization gave developing countries
in international law and organizations during the Cold War does not appear
to have created the conditions under which the procedural pluralization of
international decision-making desired by the Third World has occurred.
Woods concluded her analysis in TWAIL-like fashion by arguing that "in the
organizations and institutions which are needed to regulate and facilitate
international issues, there is little indication that powerful member states have
75 Bhala, above n.73, 168 (arguing that "on balance, the perception is that the legal
regime of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAT) and WTO do not
deliver the net benefits-in the form of faster growth and income-poverty
reduction-that the First World and its economic theorists claim").
76 On the Doha Development Round, see World Trade Organization, Doha
Development Agenda, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop.e/dda_e/ddae.htm.
77 Bhala, above n.73, 173-174.
78 Ngaire Woods, Order, Globalization, and Inequality in World Politics, in: A.
Hurrell and N. Woods (eds.), Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics (1999),
33.
79 David P. Fidler, A Kinder, Gentler System of Capitulations? International Law,
Structural Adjustment Policies, and the Standard of Liberal, Globalized
Civilization, 35 Texas ILJ (2000), 403.
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any intention of altering the hierarchical basis on which order has traditionally
been maintained, even though that hierarchy will not serve to meet the more
complex challenges of order in a globalizing world."80
In terms of the strategy of substantive pluralization of international
law, international lawyers would acknowledge that key traditional principles
(e.g., self-determination and non-intervention) and new rules championed and
crafted by developing countries (e.g., special and differential treatment in
international trade law and the EEZ) form part of contemporary international
law. The harder question is to what extent did Third World application of
these traditional and new principles during the "revolt against the West"
change the substance of international legal dynamics.
In the Cold War period, Third World use of the principle of self-
determination focused on "external self-determination," or freedom from
foreign rule or control.8i As decolonization reached its terminus with the end
of the old European empires, the principle of external self-determination lost
some of its edge in terms of Third World international legal strategy. The area
of the most heated discourse in connection with the principle of self-
determination in the post-decolonization period has been "[i]nternal self-
determination, which means the right to authentic self-government, that is, the
right for a people really and freely to choose its own political and economic
regime".82 Debates about whether international law recognizes a right to
democracy is one of the best examples of how the international law on self-
determination has dramatically shifted from the substantive manner in which
the Third World used it during the Cold War.83
This shift poses problems for the Third World's substantive
pluralization strategy because the focus on internal self-determination conflicts
with the Third World's strong support for a near absolute principle of non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of other states. During decolonization,
developing countries argued that international law allowed states to assist
peoples struggling for external self-determination;4 but, beyond that, the
80 Woods, above n.78, 35.
81 Cassesse, above n.39, 72 (arguing that the right of self-determination for colonial
peoples "only concerns external self-determination, that is, the choice of the
international status of the people and the territory where it lives").
82 Cassese, above n.39, 101.
83 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,
86 AJIL (1992), 46; Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in
International Law, 17 Yale JIL (1992), 539; Brad R. Roth, Governmental
Illegitimacy in International Law (1999).
84 Gassesse, above n.39, 199-200 (noting that international law allowed states to
"provide economic, political and logistical support to liberation movements, as
well as sending arms and ammunitions").
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principle of self-determination did not allow states to intervene in the domestic
affairs of states. Foreign support for the internal self-determination of a people
against a non-representative government can only legally occur if the non-
intervention principle contains an exception for such action. Third World
interpretations and applications of the non-intervention principle during the
Cold War recognized no such exception, making this state practice
complicated to apply when the self-determination debate now focuses on
substantive harmonization through preference for democratic government.
The Third World emphasis on a strong non-intervention principle
also ran into trouble in the post-Cold War world. Controversial policies
pursued by international financial institutions, such as "structural adjustment,"
sought to change radically the nature of economic policy in many developing
countries to fit a neo-liberal model developed and utilized by the West.85
Western-led "good governance" initiatives also saw the governance practices
of developing countries scrutinized by powerful developed states and
international organizations. 86 The "good governance" movement converged
with not only the triumph of neo-liberal economic policies but also the
growing support for a democratic entitlement in international law. As Roth
observed, "[d]emoractic entitlement proponents seek, to one extent or
another, to license 'pro-democratic' interferences in the internal processes of
sovereign states."87 In the face of these efforts by powerful Western countries
and the international institutions they controlled, the strong non-intervention
principle championed by the Third World during the Cold War was in danger
of becoming a distant memory.
In terms of the EEZ principle, it can be described as an international
legal success story because it not only appeared in UNCLOS88 but also rapidly
entered into customary international law.89 This success story can, however,
85 Bob Deacon, Social Policy in a Global Context, in: Inequality, Globalization, and
World Politics, above n.78, 220 ("Requiring governments who need access to
loans to open their countries to free trade, to reduce their public expenditures, and
to ensure a non-inflationary monetary policy has been argued by many to be the
cause of impoverishment, the further indebtedness of many countries, and the
political exhaustion of potential opposition forces").
86 See, e.g., World Bank, Governance: The World Bank's Experience (1994);
International Monetary Fund, Good Governance: The IMF's Role (1997). For a
TWAIL critique of the good governance movement, see James Thuo Gathii,
Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and
Transformation Social Projects in International Law, 5 Buffalo Human Rights LR
(1999), 107.
87 Roth, above n.83, 420.
88 UNCLOS, above n.58, arts. 55-75.
89 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, Law of the Sea (2nd ed. rev., 1988), 134 ("By
about 1976 the idea of the EEZ had become so firmly accepted by most
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be pushed critically in order to evaluate its substantive impact on international
law. First, Churchill and Lowe argue that the EEZ has not "led to any
fundamental redistribution of the ocean's resources-as many developing
countries have argued it would and should" because "few developing countries
are among the main beneficiaries of EEZs."90 They further observe that
"African, Caribbean and Middle Eastern States, in particular, come off badly"
because "[n]ot only do most such States have small EEZs, their EEZs are poor
in resources."91 Of the top fifteen beneficiaries of EEZs, only seven are
developing countries, and only one developing country is in the top seven. 92
Churchill and Lowe acknowledge that some developing states benefited from
establishing EEZs through increasing their fishing catch by reducing foreign
fishing or charging licensing fees on foreign fishing fleets.93 The EEZ's
introduction into international law has not, further, produced any
redistribution of non-living resources. 94
Second, the rapidity with which the EEZ made its way into
international law, especially custom, suggests that the EEZ principle, while
novel, was sufficiently attractive to developed countries to generate general
and consistent state practice (e.g., access to economic resources and a regime
respecting freedom of navigation in and through the EEZ). In this respect, the
EEZ was classically Westphalian in that the principle applied to all coastal
states and represented an extension of coastal state jurisdiction over natural
resources, thus conferring on the state more power in the international system.
The EEZ's development resonates with Trimble's observation that states
embrace international legal rules that are "very congenial to governments"
and that "justify or legitimate the practical exercise of state power."95 In short,
the EEZ conceptually differs from other Third World proposals exclusively
aimed at improving the international legal situation of developing countries.
The Westphalian reciprocity in the EEZ principle may be one reason
why this rule of international law is rarely, if ever, raised in contemporary
debates about the plight of the Third World in the era of globalization. One
UNCLOS participants that since then a growing number of States-some seventy-
four as of 1987-have unilaterally claimed EEZs without waiting for UNCLOS to
end or the Convention to come into force").
90 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd ed., 1999), 177. See
also predictions of this outcome in Churchill and Lowe, above n.62, 138-141 and
Churchill and Lowe, above n.89, 147-149.
91 Churchill and Lowe, above n.90, 177.
92 Churchill and Lowe, above n.90, 178.
93 Churchill and Lowe, above n.90, 177-178.
94 Churchill and Lowe, above n.90, 179.
95 Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies,
42 Stanford LR (1990), 834.
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does not see the EEZ brought forth as a substantive precedent for addressing
the problems the Third World currently faces or for creating non-reciprocal
rules that advantage developing countries. As with the principle of self-
determination, international affairs have changed sufficiently to tarnish the
EEZ's original luster as a success story of Third World influence in
international law.
The "revolt against the West" on foreign direct investment and the
CHM have suffered a substantive fate different from special and differential
treatment in international trade law and the EEZ in the law of the sea. The
thick and still growing forest of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between
capital-exporting and capital-importing states96 has obscured the developing
world's challenge to customary international legal rules on foreign direct
investment. As a general matter, the rules in BITs closely approximate the old
customary rules, such as the Hull Doctrine, than the position staked out by
developing countries in the Cold War period.97 Although arguments can be
made that the rules and standards in BITs, such the principles of prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation for expropriations8 and of fair and
equitable treatment of investors,99 do not represent customary international
law, such claims seem rather academic when capital-exporting countries rely
on treaty law rather than custom in protecting foreign direct investments
made by their nationals in developing countries.
The CHM remained a subject of intense controversy after adoption
of UNCLOS in 1982. Leading developed countries, including the United
States, refused to join UNCLOS because of the provisions relating to the
CHM concept, namely Part XI.00 UNCLOS itself did not enter into force for
96 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties Quintupled During the 1990s, Press
Release, Dec. 12, 2000, UNCTAD Doc. TAD/INF/PR/077 (reporting on the
approximately 2,000 bilateral investment treaties in existence).
97 On the substantive content of BITs, see generally Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete
Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (1995).
98 Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 Virginia JIL (1998), 687 (arguing
"that BITs offer no evidence concerning the rules of customary international law
that govern compensation for appropriations").
99 See Stephen Vasciannie, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in
International Investment Law and Practice, 70 BYIL (1999), 157-158 (arguing
that "one would be hard-pressed to identify supportive opiniojuris, particularly on
the part of developing States" that the "fair and equitable treatment" provision
found in BITs represents customary international law).
100 George Galdorisi, The United States and the Law of the Sea: Changing Interests
and New Imperatives, 4 Naval War College Review (Autumn 1996),
http://www.nwc.mil/press/review/1996/autumn/law-a96.htm (noting that the
United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, Canada, and the Soviet Union
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over a decade, partly because of developed-country opposition to Part XI.
Eventually, Part XI of the Convention was significantly amended in 1994
through another international agreement to accord with the views of
developed countries on how resources in the area should be
exploited. 110Although the 1994 agreement reaffirmed that the resources of the
seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction were the "common heritage of mankind,"102 its substantive content
bears the imprimatur of developed countries not the Third World.03 Finally,
the failure of deep sea-bed mining to develop as predicted in the late 1960s
made the CHM controversy seem like a "tempest in a teapot" with no
practical value for developing countries.104 On both the substantive rules on
exploitation of deep sea-bed resources and the economic benefits deep sea-bed
mining would generate for developing countries through international wealth
redistribution, the Third World lost.
The final aspect of the Third World's substantive pluralization
strategy reviewed above was the NIEO, and this article has already mentioned
the TWAIL argument that this project failed completely to leave its mark on
international law. Other analysts likewise see the NIEO as a failed endeavor.
Redclift and Sage argued that "the proposals for the NIEO were given a
hostile response by the North, whose strategy of foot-dragging and referral
ultimately led to their being overtaken by other developments."105 As noted
above, key elements of the NIEO agenda--external self-determination, non-
intervention, transformed rules on foreign direct investment, special and
differential treatment in international trade law, and exploitation of resources
of the deep sea-bed for the benefit of developing countries-lost relevance,
proved less effective than anticipated, or were directly defeated by developed-
refused to sign UNCLOS).
101 See Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, July 28, 1994 [hereinafter Part XI
Convention].
102 Part XI Convention, above n. 101, Preamble.
103 Churchill and Lowe, above n.90, 238 (noting that the modifications to Part XI of
UNCLOS achieved through the 1994 agreement were made "to meet the
objections to Part XI of the major western States").
104 Galdorisi, above n.100 (reporting that deep-sea bed mining has not yet occurred
and that prospects for deep sea-bed mining are bleak); Churchill and Lowe, above
n.90, 253 ("Commercial mining is still some way off; and the discoveries of
substantial land-based reserves of nickel, copper and cobalt in Canada and
elsewhere and of manganese nodules within the coastal waters of Papua New
Guinea are likely to postpone even further resort to the complex, expensive
technologies for recovering minerals from the abyssal depths").
105 Michael Redclift and Cohn Sage, Resources, Environmental Degradation, and
Inequality, in: Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics, above n.78, 129.
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country counterattack.
The NIEO effort in the 1970s involves more components than
analyzed in this article, and declaring the effort a complete failure without
more systematic analysis might be too harsh. At the same time, TWAIL
arguments that the NIEO was a failure are powerful given what happened to
specific aspects of this radical agenda and the general developments in
international relations after the Cold War. More broadly, what the TWAIL
position on the NIEO essentially means is that the substantive pluralization
strategy undertaken during the "revolt against the West" to push back
Western influence and ideas and create space for Third World alternatives did
not achieve significant and lasting success. From the TWAIL perspective,
picking over the carcass of the NIEO for international legal scraps still
remaining from the revolt seems rather unhelpful.
IIIB. Homogenization regained
The flip side of the collapse of the pluralization strategies of the Third
World is the attempted harmonization of Westphalian civilization by Western
states. Events since the end of the Cold War have seen Western and
Westernized states pushing hard to homogenize Westphalian civilization on
their political, economic, and cultural terms. Globalization and its many
processes are leading Westphalian civilization into a third stage of
harmonization. The first stage occurred after the Peace of Westphalia when
European states agreed on a framework for inter-state order and stability. The
second stage transpired in the "age of Empire" when Westphalian civilization
universalized its structure and some of its domestic substance. The third stage
is the era of globalization in which the internationalized, pluralistic
Westphalian civilization of the Cold War period is transforming into a
globalized, liberal civilization.
This on-going transformation of international relations worries scholars
concerned about the Third World because this third stage of the
harmonization of Westphalian civilization bears disturbing resemblances to
the second stage and its standard of civilization, capitulations, and
imperialism. Anghie argued, for example, that "the essential structure of the
civilizing mission may be reconstructed in the contemporary vocabulary of
human rights, governance, and economic liberalization."106 Kingsbury
likewise observed:
Emerging liberal thinking about the international legal order argues
increasingly that it is possible to divide the world into zones, with a
106 Anghie, above n.14, 80. See also Fidler, above n.20, 146-149 (arguing that the
standard of civilization has returned to world politics and international law).
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liberal zone of law, constituted by liberal states practicing a higher
degree of legal civilization, to which other states will be admitted only
when they meet the requisite standards. This is in some respects a
continuation of recurrent patterns in the history of Western legal
thought, traceable . . . in James Lorimer's late-nineteenth century
division of the world into a hierarchy of civilized nations, barbarous
humanity, and savage humanity. 107
Rapporteurs at a February 2000 conference on "International Law and the
Developing World: A Millennial Analysis" concluded that panel participants
contributed to the emergence of one central theme: "international law is
biased against the developing world."108
In short, Western intolerance toward "the other" has returned with a
vengeance and animates contemporary international law. Knowledge that the
previous pluralization strategies undertaken during decolonization collapsed
without many discernables traces in international law deepens the challenge
faced by TWAIL scholars. The new quest for a post-hegemonic global order
faces the entrenched political structure of Westphalian civilization, the surging
global (governmental and non-governmental) dynamics of liberalism, and the
disarray (and perhaps demoralization) of developing states.
III. C. Third World opposition and international law in the post-Cold War period
The failure of the Third World pluralization strategy and the
resurgence of Western homogenization reviewed in the previous two sections
does not mean that Third World opposition to aspects of international law
and international legal developments has been non-existent in the post-Cold
War period. Third World countries have unified in the face of certain
international legal controversies and have contributed to outcomes more
favorable to perceived Third World interests. For purposes of illustration,
107 Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, in: Inequality, Globalization, and
World Politics, above n.78, 90. See also Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and
Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 Harvard ILJ (2001), 201, 204
(arguing that the human rights movement employs a "damning metaphor" that
depicts a contest pitting savages against victims and saviors in which the savior is
the West, meaning that the "human rights corpus, though well-meaning, is
fundamentally Eurocentric").
108 Poppi Hagan and Zachary Lomo, Symposium Panel Report-International Law
and the Developing World: A Millennial Analysis: Panel I: Post-Colonial
Statehood, Legitimacy, and International Governance, 41 Harvard ILJ (2000),
599.
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three examples can be analyzed briefly: Third World opposition to (1) the
failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI); (2) the effort to link trade
benefits within the WTO to compliance with international labor standards;
and (3) U.S. and European attempts to weaken safeguard provisions, such as
the right to engage in compulsory licensing, in the WTO Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
The MAI represented an attempt, based within the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), to create a multilateral
treaty for international legal rules on foreign direct investment.109 This effort
sought to move international law on foreign direct investment away from the
bilateral path blazed by BITs toward a harmonized, global set of rules to
facilitate and protect foreign direct investment. Developed countries and
corporations based in them pushed for the MAI within the OECD.I 0 The
MAI process collapsed in 1998 because of opposition generated by non-
governmental organizations and developing-country governments. " '
The 1990s also witnessed an effort by developed countries, including
the United States and the European Union, to link compliance with
international labor standards to the enjoyment of trade benefits under WTO
agreements, such as GATT. The idea behind the linkage was to use access to
markets as an instrument to force Third World countries to raise their labor
laws and practices to internationally recognized levels. At both the Singapore
and Seattle WTO ministerial meetings, developing countries presented united
opposition to making the trade-labor linkage part of WTO policy and law.12
Such Third World opposition ensured that international trade law under the
WTO would not be radically changed to include the linkage.
Another WTO controversy that saw effective Third World opposition
to Western-led international legal maneuvers involved the ability of
developing countries to use parallel importing and compulsory licensing to
increase the availability of and access to essential drugs and medicines in
connection with serious public health problems, such as HIV/AIDS. The
109 On the MAI generally, see Steven J. Canner, The Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, Cornell ILJ (1998), 657 and David Henderson, The MAI Affair: A
Story and Its Lessons (1999).
110 Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment: Where Now?, 34 International Lawyer (1999), 1039 (noting that the
United States and the European Union pushed the MAI proposal within the
OECD).
HI Muchlinski, above n. 110, 1048-1049.
112 David P. Fidler, International Law and Global Public Health (2000), 444.
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United States, supported by the European Union and major pharmaceutical
companies, took a hard line against developing countries, such as South Africa
and Thailand, which sought to use parallel importing and compulsory
licensing as part of the policy response to the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic in
their respective territories.113 Third World governments, supported by non-
governmental organizations, successfully forced the United States and the
European Union to retreat and recognize the primacy of public health over
patent protection in the WTO Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health issued at the Doha Ministerial Meeting in November 2001.1"4
These examples illustrate that the Third World has forged unified
positions vis-a-vis Western-initiated international legal efforts. Such efforts are,
however, a far cry from the ambitious pluralization strategy undertaken by
Third World countries during the Cold War. First, in each example described
above, the Third World was on the defensive in the face of Western-led
international legal strategies. Procedurally and substantively, the Third World
reacted to the international legal agenda being set by the West in different
areas. As noted above, the Third World's earlier pluralization strategy
exhibited the opposite dynamic-the West was on the defensive in the face of
procedural and substantive reform championed by developing countries.
Second, in the MAI and TRIPS controversies, global non-
governmental activism was as or more prominent than opposition from Third
World governments."15 During decolonization and the Cold War, the Third
World mounted its procedural and substantive challenges to international law
113 See Caroline Thomas, Trade Policy, the Politics of Access to Drugs and Global
Governance for Health, in: K. Lee (ed.), Health Impacts of Globalization:
Towards Global Governance (2003), 182-185.
114 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Dec. 15,
1993 [hereinafter, TRIPS]; WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, Nov. 14, 2001,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ ministe/min0 l_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.
On the background of this Declaration, see Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3
ChicagoJIL (2002), 27.
115 See Muchlinski, above n. 110, 1049 ("The political opposition to the Agreement
generated by the NGO community undoubtedly made a significant contribution
by raising awareness of its one-sided nature, and by offering an organized critique
based on the unaccountability of MNEs and of the multilateral economic
organizations that were trying to introduce the MA."); 't Hoen, above n. 114, 33-
34 (discussing important role non-governmental organizations played "in drawing
attention to the provisions of TRIPS that can be used to increase access to
medicines").
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through state action that did not rely on the participation and support of non-
state actors. Although the influence of non-governmental organizations in the
MAI and TRIPS controversies reflects a shift from international toward global
governance, the shift may signal the further deterioration of the Third World's
quantitative advantage it marshaled effectively during decolonization.
Third, in each of these contemporary cases, the Third World was
defending the status quo rather than promoting an alternative international
legal vision. As mentioned above, most Third World countries have entered
into BITs, meaning that they have accepted, through a network of bilateral
agreements, the substantive protections for foreign investors and investments
the MAI would have included.116 In other words, the worldwide web of
investor-friendly BITs represents an effective substitute for the MAI in terms
of substantive legal protections for foreign direct investment. Third World
concern for the MAI did not resemble the substantive challenge mounted
during the period of decolonization to the traditional rules of customary
international law on foreign direct investment. From the point of view of
capital-exporting states, the MAI was ultimately expendable and not worth
the fight because, substantively, these states have achieved the international
legal protections they want through BITs."17
In connection with the controversial linkage of trade and labor
standards, the Third World was defending the status quo under international
trade law-trade liberalization is not directly conditioned on the achievement
of other social objectives, such as higher labor standards.118 The Third World's
efforts on international trade law in the 1960s and 1970s rejected the status
quo and sought to create new substantive law through special and preferential
treatment in GATT for developing countries.
With regards to access to drugs and medicines, again the Third World
found itself defending principles contained in existing international law. Before
the creation of the WTO, many developing countries refused to recognize
patents on pharmaceutical products in an effort to ensure accessibility and
116 Muchlinski, above n. 110, 1038 (noting that "the draft MAI was based on earlier
models of binding investor protection standards, leading it to be crafted as an
investor and investment protection and promotion agreement").
117 Muchlinski, above n. 110, 1053 (noting British doubts "whether there is a high
priority for action on investor protection rules ... given the existing network of
bilateral investment agreements.").
118 The only trade-labor link in GATT appears in Article XX(e), which allows
contracting parties to restrict trade in products made by prison labor.
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affordability to essential drugs and medicines.119 For developing countries
joining the WTO, TRIPS required that pharmaceutical patents be
recognized.120 TRIPS effectively harmonized global treatment of
pharmaceuticals under patent law on terms favored and promoted by the
West, squeezing out the pluralism that previously existed on granting patents
on pharmaceutical products.
The TRIPS controversy did not involve the Third World rejecting
TRIPS and its Westernized harmonization of patent law but focused on
whether TRIPS allowed WTO member states to engage in parallel importing
and compulsory licensing, which TRIPS clearly does. 121 Part of the reason the
United States and European countries backed down was because their legal
position was weak given that TRIPS does not regulate parallel importing and
recognizes the right to engage in compulsory licensing. Further, the
catastrophic scale of the HIV/AIDS debacle in the developing world,
especially sub-Saharan Africa,22 supported Third World opposition to the
hard line taken by the United States and Europe. Having to rely for support
on a disaster of historic proportions provides telling evidence of how radically
transformed the context of Third World opposition in international law has
become from the days of the "revolt against the West."
Fourth, these three examples of post-Cold War opposition in
international law do not connect strategically the way in which Third World
governments crafted their earlier pluralization movement. As the NIEO
demonstrated, the Third World linked its international legal reform efforts
into a comprehensive procedural and substantive vision. Discerning a
comprehensive strategic vision from the Third World in the MAI, trade-labor
linkage, and TRIPS controversies is difficult, if not impossible. The
disintegration of the comprehensive NIEO vision was, of course, underway
over the course of the 1980s and 1990s as the debt crisis, collapse of Soviet
communism, and the acceleration of globalization transformed the political
landscape of world affairs. The three examples reviewed above suggest that
this transformation of world politics has also transformed Third World
opposition from an offensive, strategic campaign to defensive, ad hoc
119 Bernard Pecoul et al, Access to Essential Drugs in Poor Countries: A Lost Battle?,
281 J American Medical Association (1999), 361; Fidler, above n. 112, 259.
120 TRIPS, above n. 114, art. 27.
121 TRIPS, above n. 114, arts. 6 (providing that TRIPS does not apply to parallel
importing) and 31 (setting out conditions for using compulsory licenses).
122 See UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2002 (2002) on the scale of the
HIV/AIDS pandemic.
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reactions.
IV. The quest for a post-hegemonic global order: The
tolerance /intolerance paradox
IVA. Pluralism and solidanrsm in international relations theory
The challenge facing the new quest for a post-hegemonic global order
connects to a long-running discourse in international relations and
international legal theory about pluralism and solidarism. This discourse,
generally speaking, assumes the continuation of the system of sovereign states
interacting in a condition of anarchy (i.e., the structure of Westphalian
civilization). Crudely stated, pluralism is associated with the acceptance of
political, economic, and cultural diversity at the domestic level, while
solidarism posits the need for similitude at the domestic level among states.
Under pluralism, the scope of international society among states is
limited because the common interests and values of diverse states do not
penetrate deeply into domestic affairs. The pluralist conception of
international society "highlights the procedural and institutional features of
the international system . . . , such as the exchange and treatment of
diplomats, treaty law, the requirement of reciprocity, and the principle of
nonintervention."]23 For pluralists, "international society functions as a
pragmatic dynamic that accommodates cultural difference."124 As a reflection
of international society, international law in pluralistic thought is limited and
mechanical-it deals primarily with the formal interaction of states across
borders because the internal aspects of sovereignty are off limits. Linklater's
observation that "[p]luralism has been accepted and solidarism resisted125
could characterize the Cold War period.
In solidaristic thought, international law's scope is both expanded and
reduced. The scope expands because the body of shared values and common
interests among solidaristic states incorporates aspects of domestic politics,
economics, and culture, providing a stronger platform for using international
law to shore up such values and interests (e.g., the use of international trade
law to pursue free trade). The scope decreases because the likemindedness of
solidaristic states means that international law is often not needed to regulate
certain inter-state interactions (e.g., the paucity of treaties between developed,
capitalist economies on the treatment of foreign direct investment).126
123 David P. Fidler andJennifer M. Welsh, Introduction, in: Empire and Community,
above n.16, 52.
124 Fidler and Welsh, above n.123, 52.
125 Linklater, above n.36, 106.
126 Guzman, above n.98, 680 (indicating that "no two developed countries have
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The typical conclusion from comparing pluralism and solidarism is that
solidarism supports a more robust system of international law. In other words,
to produce an effective and efficient system of international law requires a
certain level of solidarism in the international system at the level of domestic
politics, economics, law, and culture. Bull noted that most historical international
societies "were all founded upon a common culture or civilisation, or at least
on some of the elements of such a civilisation: a common language, a common
epistemology and understanding of the universe, a common religion, a
common ethical code, a common aesthetic or artistic tradition."27 By contrast,
pluralism seeks to cordon off domestic affairs from the realm of international
law, thus directing international law into a mechanical, limited set of functions
that do not (and perhaps cannot) connect in any deep way with cultural
affinities.
IVB. The tolerance/intolerance paradox
From this overview, solidarism can be linked to intolerance and
pluralism with tolerance in connection with international law. To seek
similitude among states domestically is to be intolerant of difference. To
advance pluralism among states is to be tolerant of difference. Intolerance and
tolerance can exist simultaneously in international relations-intolerance
within a solidaristic set of states and tolerance between the solidaristic states
and other states that do not share the same domestic political, economic, legal,
or cultural preferences. Under this scenario, clear boundaries would exist
between the solidaristic and the pluralistic systems. One could think of the
Cold War system as reflecting this dynamic: solidarism existed among a group
of liberal states and among a group of socialist states, and these two groups
had pluralistic relations with the developing world.
This characterization of the Cold War system does not accurately
capture what happened in those difficult decades. The picture painted is too
simplistic. Part of the simplicity reflects a failure to focus on the
tolerance/intolerance paradox. For tolerance (and thus pluralism) to be
sustained in international relations, states must reach solidarity on the
importance of the value of pluralism. Solidarity is, however, a function of
intolerance-the unwillingness to accept behavior different from prescribed
norms. Tolerance requires, thus, solidarism among states that pluralism
should be an important principle of inter-state relations and international law.
Tolerance, in other words, emerges out of intolerance.
Some historical examples of this tolerance/intolerance paradox
entered into a BIT with one another").
127 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (1977),
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illustrate the point. Solidarism on pluralism as an organizing principle
occurred in Europe in the aftermath of both the Thirty Years' War and the
French Revolution/Napoleonic wars. Out of the Peace of Westphalia came
the basic organizing principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of
states. The wars triggered by the French Revolution threatened this
commitment to non-intervention as the revolutionary transformation of
internal France shook the stability and order of the international system in
Europe. Tension between the powers of the Holy Alliance and Great Britain
after the Napoleonic wars concerned whether pro-monarchical intervention
should replace the principle of non-intervention as the operative norm. British
adhesion to the traditional, pluralistic balance-of-power framework eventually
prevailed over the solidaristic vision of the pro-monarchist powers.
The quest for a post-hegemonic global order cannot, therefore, be a
first-order quest for pluralism. The quest has to be for solidarism among states
that pluralism needs to be the operative principle among states having
different domestic forms of government, economic practices, and cultural and
civilizational heritages. The quest needs to be an intolerant pursuit of
tolerance in order for pluralism to become an effective principle in
international law.
The historical examples of the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War
and the French Revolution/Napoleonic wars provide insight into another
aspect of the tolerance/intolerance paradox: to achieve solidarism on
pluralism as an operative principle in international law and relations, some
level of solidarism must already exist among states. The European states had
already developed a common history, common forms of political and
economic organization, common religious traditions, and a sense (even if only
among aristocrats and merchants) of a shared heritage and destiny. This pre-
existing similitude must, logically, also be the product of intolerance (i.e., other
forms of political, economic, and cultural organization have been rejected).
Pluralism as an operative international legal principle must, therefore, have
solidarism (intolerance) not only as a foundation but also as the objective of
political action.
The tolerance/intolerance paradox poses serious problems for TWAIL
appeals for a more tolerant post-hegemonic global order. TWAIL scholarship
challenges the legitimacy of the global structure provided by Westphalian
civilization for many developing nations because the structure is biased in
favor of the West. The "revolt against the West" turned out to be a "revolt
from within the West" as developing states largely accepted their
incorporation into Westphalian civilizationI28 and attempted to use the
128 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, Conclusion, in: The Expansion of International
Society, above n.32, 433 ("Indeed, the most striking feature of the global
international society of today is the extent to which the states of Asia and Africa
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mechanisms of this civilization, including international law, to render it more
tolerant of political, economic, and cultural differences. Anghie noted that
"[t]he optimistic international lawyers of the 1960s, even those notable
scholars from developing nations, who were the most trenchant critics of the
Eurocentric character of international law, were hopeful that the acquisition
of sovereignty by developing nations and participation in international legal
forums would result in the creation of a truly universal, just, and equal
international system."129
Success in this endeavor proved either dependent on balance of
power politics (e.g., developing countries playing the superpowers off against
each other to create structural space to maneuver) or substantively ephemeral
(e.g., the "victory" achieved in the area of customary international law on
foreign investment). But, is today's quest for a post-hegemonic global order
really a quest for a radically different structure for human interaction that
extracts the Third World from the structure of Westphalian civilization? Or is
it a project designed to re-direct Westphalian solidarism toward its older
substantive commitment to pluralism? Is it a plea for a more humane form of
intolerance?
V. The role of intolerance in international law
VA. International law and intolerance
The ferment in international relations in the post-Cold War era
encouraged international legal theorists to explore basic questions about
international law anew. Franck characterized the new environment of inquiry
in this way:
The questions to which the international lawyer must now be prepared to
respond, in this post-ontological era, are different from the traditional
have embraced such basic elements of European international society as the
sovereign state, the rules of international law, the procedures and conventions of
diplomacy and international organization").
129 Anghie, above n.14, 75. See also Antony Anghie, Civilization and Commerce:
The Concept of Governance in Historical Perspective, 45 Villanova LR (2000),
888-889 (pointing out that "developing states that protested against certain rules,
which, they claimed, furthered colonialism, have accepted in large part the basic
principles of international law"); and James Thuo Gathii, International Law and
Eurocentricity, 9 EJIL (1998), 189 (characterizing scholarship of developing-world
international legal scholars in two different catergories: the integrationists who saw
potential in developing-country participation in international law through legal
reform, and the nationalists who saw no hope for developing countries within the
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inquiry: whether international law is law? Instead, we are now asked: is
international law effective? Is it enforceable? Is it understood? And, the
most important question: Is it fair?130
Looking at the TWAIL quest for a post-hegemonic global order in light of the
tolerance/intolerance paradox raises another important theoretical question:
Is international law intolerant?
TWAIL analysis of how the encounter between the West and the non-
Western world through nineteenth century imperialism and colonialism
shaped international law is, in essence, a study of how Eurocentric intolerance
drove international law in this period. Contemporary worries about
liberalism's hegemony in international relations also reflect concerns about
intolerance shaping international legal doctrines and discourse. The
solidaristic and pluralistic perspectives on international law and relations turn
out to be perspectives on different kinds of solidarism, or different forms of
intolerance.
Whether intolerance has some deeper theoretical importance in
international law is not, in fact, a novel question. Kingsbury observed that "a
persistent feature of international law, [is] the problem of reaching normative
judgments in a heterogenous world while simultaneously accommodating
deep cultural, social and religious differences." '131 Phrased differently,
Kingsbury noted that international law constantly struggles to balance
intolerance (i.e., normative judgments in a heterogenous world) with tolerance
(i.e., accommodating deep cultural, social and religious differences). But note
that Kingsbury's observation suggests that intolerance plays an important
function in international law.
Gong's study of the standard of civilization in international society led
him to similar conclusions about the role of intolerance in international law.
Gong argued that "[s]ome standard of civilization will remain a feature of any
international society wherein cultural diversity and pluralism exists
coetaneously with hierarchy and anarchy, regardless of how strong the ties of
society are."132 Important to Gong's conclusion is the structural context of
sovereign states interacting in a condition of anarchy, meaning that the
political structure of international relations plays a critical function in how
intolerance affects international law. Anghie also questioned whether
intolerance remains integral to the substantive concepts alive in contemporary
existing structure of international law and advocated radical restructuring).
130 Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995), 6.
131 Benedict Kingsbury, Confronting Difference: The Puzzling Durability of Gentili's
Combination of Pragmatic Pluralism and Normative Judgment, 92 AJIL (1998),
713.
132 Gong, above n.34, 248.
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world politics: "The more alarming and likely possibility is that the civilizing
mission is inherent in one form or another in the principal concepts and
categories that govern our existence: ideas of modernity, progress,
development, emancipation, and rights."133
VB. Structural and substantive tolerance/intolerance
How, then, in the anarchical structure of international relations
dominated substantively by liberal political and economic thinking do states
and peoples calibrate intolerance in international law to improve the lot of the
Third World? Conceptually, the relationship between intolerance and
international law is a function of the amount of structural and substantive
tolerance in the international system.
Structural tolerance concerns the amount of flexibility in the
international system regarding the hierarchy and distribution of power. A
structurally intolerant system is one in which small changes in the hierarchy
and distribution of power threaten order and stability. A structurally tolerant
system is one in which changes in the hierarchy and distribution of power do
not undermine systemic stability. Substantive tolerance involves respect in the
international system for different political, economic, and social practices and
beliefs within and among states. A substantively intolerant system is hostile to
differences in political, economic, legal, and cultural beliefs and practices
within and among states. A substantively tolerant system accepts and protects
such differences in state interaction.
From historical experience, we can postulate that international law
changes rapidly in international systems characterized by structural tolerance
and substantive intolerance. The nineteenth century "age of Empire" and the
contemporary era of globalization fit this description. Structurally, the
scramble for imperial possessions in non-European regions did not destabilize
the European balance of power during the nineteenth century. Resistance
from non-Western countries to the expansion of European influence did not
threaten the hierarchy or distribution of power in the international system
significantly, as illustrated by the relative ease with which European states
imposed their will on China in the nineteenth century. When imperialism
complicated relations among European states seriously, traditional great-
power management of the expanding system kept matters more or less orderly
(e.g., the partition of Africa at the Conference of Berlin in 1884-1885). While
the growth of European influence in non-Western regions affected balance of
power politics among Europe states, 3 4 the eventual explosion came from
133 Anghie, above n.14, 80. See also Mutua, above n.2, 37 (arguing that "a certain
level of universality is inevitable, and even desirable" in international law).
'34 Hinsley, above n.30, 264-266 (discussing impact of imperialism on the
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within Europe in the form of the World War 1.135
Substantively, the nineteenth century expansion of European power
into the non-European world was intolerant, as evidenced by the racism,
discrimination, and exploitation meted out to non-Western nations and
peoples by the European powers and the United States in their imperial
realms and activities. This intolerance fueled the dramatic geographical
expansion of the system of international law and substantive changes in
international law, such as the standard of civilization, which occurred.
In the era of globalization, the international system is again
structurally tolerant. The post-Cold War system accommodated revolutionary
changes in the hierarchy and distribution of power without global, systemic
instability. The bipolar balance of power seen in the Cold War peacefully gave
way to an international system dominated by a single military and economic
superpower and its likeminded liberal allies. The system's current hegemons
are not interested in territorial acquisition, which also fosters systemic stability.
Further, the emergence of new powers, such as China, is partly being
channeled through existing international mechanisms (e.g., Chinese
membership in the WTO) rather than posing a destabilizing factor in
international politics.
As TWAIL scholarship argues, substantive intolerance characterizes
international relations in the global era, as liberal concepts of government,
governance, law, economics, and human rights dominate international
political and legal agendas. Part of this substantive intolerance reflects the
growth of Western power in the post-Cold War period,136 while part of the
intolerance represents the lack of any substantive challenger to liberalism as a
normative philosophy.137 Hardt and Negri provocatively labeled the political
and philosophical power of the liberal West in the era of globalization as
"Empire"-a regime "that rules over the entire 'civilized' world."138 Today's
substantive intolerance in the international system reflects, then, a new "age of
Empire."
management of great power politics in Europe).
135 Structural tolerance was also present within Europe during the nineteenth century.
German power grew, for example, through unification and war (1866-1868; 1870-
1871) without sparking a crisis in the balance of power. This structural tolerance
deteriorated into intolerance in the first decade of the twentieth century, leading to
World War I.
136 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 Foreign Affairs (Summer
1993), 39 ("The West is now at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other
civilizations").
137 See, most famously, Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, The National
Interest (Summer 1989), 3.
138 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (2000), xiv.
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The period of decolonization-arguably the zenith of pluralism in
international relations after the global expansion of Westphalian civilization-
occurred in an international system characterized by structural intolerance.
The tense, global contest between U.S. and Soviet power made the system
hyper-sensitive to actual and perceived power shifts (e.g., the "domino
theory"), and the developing world became a key structural component of the
balance-of-power calculus for both superpowers.
During the same period, substantive tolerance was present as the system
exhibited not only capitalist and socialist governments and economies but also
developing-country efforts at non-alignment and domestic political and
economic experimentation designed to liberate developing countries from
their former subjection to Western power. The competing blocs of states
contested at every step many existing rules of international law (e.g.,
customary international law on the treatment of foreign direct investment) and
changes in international law in this period (e.g., human rights), producing
difficult times for international law.
From these observations, we can posit that the ideal international
system for the quest for a post-hegemonic global order is one characterized by
structural and substantive tolerance-in other words, systemic stability and
substantive political, economic, and cultural pluralism. International systems
exhibiting structural tolerance have been or are characterized, however, by
substantive uniformity or hegemony-the nineteenth century imperial system
and the post-Cold War system. The international systems that exhibited
substantive tolerance-the post-Peace of Westphalia and the Cold War
systems-suffered from structural intolerance and a great deal of warfare and
violence. The structural intolerance of the Cold War system also produced
superpower exploitation of, and abuses in, the Third World.
The quest for a post-hegemonic global order perhaps faces, therefore, a
choice between (1) fomenting structural instability in international politics
through challenges to the current hierarchy of power (i.e., moving from
structural tolerance to intolerance by destabilizing the existing configurations
of power in order to create space for Third World pluralism); or (2) fostering
pluralism as a common interest and value of the global hegemonic system
(i.e., global solidarism on the importance of pluralism). The choice is, then, a
choice between a revolt against the West-a challenge to the West's structural
hegemony in military, political, and economic power-and a revolt from
within the West--an attempt to make the hegemony's substantive agenda
more tolerant of the interests and needs of the Third World.
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VI. TWAIL and the quest for a post-hegemonic global order
TWAIL scholarship provides a powerful critique of how the West has
used international law as an instrument of intolerance in its dealings with the
Third World. TWAIL analysis of international law contains a desire for
international law to promote "unity in diversity" in order to allow the Third
World to escape from perceived structural and substantive marginalization in
international law and relations. Gathii characterized this effort as a process of
"decentering" international legal discourse from its continuing Eurocentricity
and denigration of non-Western sources of ideas and practices. 139 Mutua
argued that the TWAIL task involves "reconceptualizing and restructuring
international law."140 In addition, like the majority of developing-world
international lawyers during the decolonization quest for a post-hegemonic
order, TWAIL analysis accepts the basic structure of Westphalian civilization
(i.e., sovereign states interacting in a condition of anarchy) but hopes to
promote a different substantive ethos for this civilization.141 In short, the
TWAIL project appears to be a revolt from within Westphalian framework,
not a revolt against it.
Beyond these observations, it is hard to discern common threads in
TWAIL scholarship about (1) what kind of tolerance/pluralism to advance
(substance); and (2) how to advance tolerance/pluralism in the face of
intolerant hegemony (procedure). 142 Pluralism based on insights from historical
139 James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism, and International Governance:
Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 Michigan LR
(2000), 2054.
140 Makau Mutua, Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an
Insider-Outsider, 45 Villanova LR (2000), 851-852.
141 This dynamic can be seen in Mutua's arguments that "TWAIL believes
international law is necessary and important" but that "TWAIL is fundamentally
a reconstructive movement that seeks a new compact of international law").
Mutua, above n.2, 36, 38. See also Gathii, above n.3, 2067 (arguing that Third
World positions on international challenge prevailing perspectives "and suggest ...
that a re-imagining or, indeed, revision of international economic and legal
relations would not unduly destabilize international society"); Mickelson, above
n.5, 413-414 ("These [Third World] authors appear to operate on the basis of the
possibility of transforming international society, and indeed might otherwise have
found their work difficult to justify. In the end, however, they reject the idea of an
alternative model that will simply be set up in place of the existing system. Their
focus is on process, on creating structures and a normative foundation for bringing
about ajust international order").
142 This observation connects with more general concerns that Third World writers
on international law "have failed to propose and articulate an alternative
approach [to international law] which is inclusive and internally consistent." B. S.
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materialism might be different from pluralism grounded in respect for
indigenous, non-Western cultures, to which historical materialism may be just
as alien as liberalism. If "unity in diversity" is the rallying cry, then the
substantive nature of the diversity needs to be clarified both in terms of the
underlying analytical approach and the specific political features of the
diversity in question. It is not clear how far TWAIL scholarship has provided
ways, to paraphrase Kingsbury, of reaching normative judgments in a
heterogeneous world while accommodating deep political, economic, and
cultural differences.
Some confusion about the TWAIL quest for a post-hegemonic global
order comes from the tension created by the plea for pluralism and the
demand for assistance from the West. The call for pluralism often reflects
Third World distaste for what Friedman called the "golden straitjacket"143 of
liberal economic theory and practice in the era of globalization. Policies of
international financial institutions have come under TWAIL attack for their
insensitivity to the peculiarities of Third World politics, economics, and
culture.144 The demand for pluralism in economic development policy often
comes hand-in-hand with an equally vocal call for the West to transfer wealth
and resources and to forgive debt in order to help Third World nations
develop on their own terms. This theory of obligation does not resonate with
the hegemons; nor does it answer hard questions about how transferred
wealth or forgiven debt should be consumed in Third World nations and who
should structure such consumption.
Mutua claims that TWAIL "has a basic interest in the internal
reconstruction and genuine democratization of Third World states."45 This
interest leads to questions about the substantive nature of, and procedural
route to, this internal reconstruction and democratization. Does decentering
Eurocentric discourse and contextualizing the resulting analysis in order to
give more respect to Third World societies produce concrete and realistic
blueprints for economic development and poverty alleviation in Third World
countries?,46
Chimni, International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary
Approaches (1993), 19.
143 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding
Globalization (2000), 101-111 (discussing his concept of the "Golden Straitjacket"
of the rules of the free market in today's global economy).
144 See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization,
International Financial Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U.JILP (2000),
243.
145 Mutua, above n.2, 37.
146 Some commentators are skeptical about this kind of project. See Friedman, above
n.143, 103 (arguing that "[p]eople can talk about alternatives to the free market
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TWAIL scholarship finds itself somewhere between two extremes on
this issue: (1) the extreme represented by the imposition of the "Washington
consensus"'147 on economic development (i.e., substantive intolerance); and (2)
the extreme represented by a strong rule of non-intervention into the political
and economic affairs of sovereign developing states (i.e., substantive tolerance).
Developing-country international lawyers during decolonization leaned
heavily on the concept of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention as
a strategy to create pluralism in international relations. TWAIL scholarship
does not seem drawn to this approach, suggesting that TWAIL positions itself
closer to substantive intolerance than the sovereignists of decolonization.
Mutua claimed, for example, that part of the core of TWAIL thinking
is not only a rejection of Western hegemony but also a drive "to transform-
from within-Third World cultures, philosophies, and practices that are
inimical to human development."148 Mutua's observation contains elements of
solidarism-the idea that a universal concept of human development exists-
and elements of pluralism-the emphasis that transformation is to take place
from within rather than being imposed from without. While TWAIL
scholarship frowns on the substantive intolerance reflected in such things as
the Washington consensus on economic development, it is not clear what kind
of intolerance TWAIL scholars prefer and how such intolerance can be
created and maintained in international relations.
There seems to be some TWAIL consensus that the statist approach
that characterized the decolonization quest for a post-hegemonic order is
unlikely to produce results because many Third World states are as much a
part of the problem as part of the solution. Some TWAIL scholars place
emphasis on local and transnational social movements as engines of reform for
the Third World and international law.149 The mass protests against
globalization seen from Seattle to Genoa are sometimes invoked as indicia of
the potential transformatory power of transnational social movements and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).150
and global integration, they can demand alternatives, they can insist on a 'Third
Way,' but for now none is apparent. This is very different from the first era of
globalization").
147 For an analysis of the "Washington consensus," see Mois~s Naim, Washington
Consensus or Washington Confusion?, Foreign Policy (Spring 2000), 87.
148 Mutua, above n.140, 852.
149 See, e.g., Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third
World, Social Movements, and the Expansion of International Institutions, 41
Harvard ILJ (2000), 529.
150 On the importance of non-governmental organizations in contemporary world
politics, see Peter Willetts, Transnational Actors and International Organizations
in Global Politics, in: The Globalization of World Politics, above n.23, 356.
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Disentangling what these anti-globalization protests represent for the
Third World generally and TWAIL specifically is, however, difficult. The
views of the groups participating in these protests range from violent
destruction of international economic and financial institutions to the peaceful
interpretation of international agreements in order to give Third World
countries more flexibility in meeting national problems (e.g., interpreting
TRIPS to ensure access to essential medicines in developing countries). The
TWAIL quest for a post-hegemonic order needs to be more coherent than the
unwieldy, opaque conglomeration of global civil society groups protesting
globalization at high-profile diplomatic events. TWAIL can be neither a
dogma nor a cacophony of contradictory claims.
In addition, global activism by civil society groups at local and global
levels (even those hostile toward intolerant Western hegemony) fits easily
within liberal conceptions of international relations.15, Domestically, liberalism
encourages citizen participation in politics through principles such as free
speech and the right to vote. Internationally, liberalism focuses on
transnational connections between individuals and non-state actors (e.g.,
NGOs and companies) as part of creating interdependence between
societies.52 One can analogize between liberalism's tolerance for global civil
society activism and the role of free speech in democratic societies.153 The
right to free speech provides a procedural foundation for political protest, but
substantive decisions about policies and laws are made through electoral and
legislative processes. Every citizen is free to speak; but this right does not
ensure anyone is going to pay attention. Liberal politics in the era of
globalization likewise encourages "global free speech," but this space for
global discourse does not mean that the discourse generated will affect
political and economic decisions made by states and international
organizations.
Transnational social movements and NGOs have space today to speak
and protest; but states and the international institutions make the substantive
151 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations, 285
Recueil des Cours (2000), 109 ("The adversarial activist model of NGOs is
remarkably consistent with Liberal international relations theory").
152 On liberalism as a theory of international relations, see Timothy Dunne,
Liberalism, in: The Globalization of World Politics, above n.23, 162; Scott
Burchill, Liberal Internationalism, in: Theories of International Relations, above
n.36, 28; Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Politics, 51 International Organization (1997), 513.
153 See Benedict Kingsbury, First Amendment Liberalism as Global Legal
Architecture: Ascriptive Groups and the Problems of the Liberal NGO Model of
International Civil Society, 3 Chicago JIL (2002), 183 (arguing that "an
operational code resembling First Amendment liberalism has been the de facto
guide in the construction of international civil society").
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decisions. Procedural pluralism in international relations-the involvement of
states and non-state actors in international politics and economics-is a core
substantive value of the globalized, liberal civilization under construction that
TWAIL scholarship opposes. TWAIL reliance on local and transnational
social movements and NGOs might, therefore, represent acceptance of a key
substantive aspect of the globalized, liberal civilization in the same way that
the decolonization period's statist approach represented acceptance of the
structural dictates of Westphalian civilization. 154
VII. Conclusion
Additional observations about the difficulties faced by the TWAIL
quest for a post-hegemonic global order could be made, but TWAIL scholars
and symphathizers do not need more reminders of the obstacles their quest
confronts. The essential dilemma of the TWAIL quest has been identified
many times in international relations theory-finding ground for reform
between the extremes of utopianism and realpolitik.155 Structurally, the TWAIL
quest would be ill-advised to attempt to destabilize the international system by
challenging the military, political, and economic hegemony of the West. The
current "war on terrorism" has been sparked by a desire by radical Islamic
groups to revolt against the West through violence and terror. I cannot see
anything but suffering for the Third World in that strategy. The events of
September 11, 2001 have already re-shaped global politics in ways that make
the United States and its anti-terrorism allies less tolerant of views that
challenge Western political and philosophical hegemony.
This leaves the strategy of attacking the substantive intolerance of
Western hegemony and working to create a new solidarism of "unity in
diversity" and a new pluralism that defines that diversity in a substantively
credible manner. This conclusion echoes Falk's argument that "international
law and lawyers can best contribute to the prospects of fashioning a more
humane type of global civilization by self-confidently entering the dialogic
154 These observations echo those of Chimni, who argued that "[i]t is... not unusual
to see a Third World scholar speaking of rejecting rules which are prejudicial to
the interests of developing countries [yet] embracing a theory of international law
and world order which seeks to justify and protect the status quo and has little to
say on the situation of the developing world. This eventually leads him to assume
positions which strengthen that which he had set out to fight." Chimni, above
n.142, 19.
155 See, e.g., Ian Clark, The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in
International Order (1989), 49-89 (analyzing the traditions of optimism and
despair in international relations theory); Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A
Critical Introduction (2000), 283-314 (analyzing reforms designed to produce a
humane global future).
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space between entrenched political power and transnational social forces,
acknowledging the relevance of both, but subordinating their autonomy to
neither."156
Key to this strategy are the assumptions that the substantive intolerance
witnessed today is (1) more amenable to change than the substantive
intolerance that animated international law in the "age of Empire";57 and (2)
amenable to adjustment through the craft of international law rather than just
through power politics.158 The construction of a globalized civilization "based
on genuine universalization"159 may only be viable in the long run if a new
solidarism and pluralism that take into account the interests and needs of the
Third World is created intellectually and implemented practically.
TWAIL confronts, however, the sobering fact that this description of
the challenge is neither novel nor perhaps persuasive. Bull argued well over
twenty years ago that the prospects for international society depended on the
development of a consensus among the great powers and other states that took
in account the demands of weak and poor countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America.60 TWAIL scholarship highlights the extent to which (1) those
demands are still not heeded; and (2) solidarism has powerfully coalesced
around liberal political and economic thinking rather than broadening into a
more pluralistic project. Since 1648, the scope of pluralism in international
society has been primarily a function of structural tolerance/intolerance in the
international system not intellectual discontent with Western arrogance and
discourse on the need for more respect for non-Western societies. Pluralism
has been pursued in the past when this pursuit served the structural interests of
the international system in order and stability not because pluralism would
produce a more just and humane world.
In its formative stages, TWAIL seeks to create its own version of what
Falk called "dialogic space" in order to chart a new direction for international
law's future. In this quest, TWAIL confronts an international system
156 Richard Falk, The Coming Global Civilization: Neo-Liberal or Humanist?, in: A.
Anghie and G. Sturgess (eds.), Legal Visions of the 21st Century: Essays in
Honour ofJudge Christopher Weeramantry (1998), 32.
157 See Hardt and Negri, above n.138, 353 (judging "Empire as less bad or better
than the previous paradigm of power from the standpoint of the multitude").
158 Mutua, above n.140, 847 ("Exploitation and repression, for the past five centuries,
have been a global phenomenon.The response to them must also be coordinated
on a global basis. In a strange twist, international law may facilitate this process by
default. The norms, processes, structures and institutions that operate under this
broad rubric of international law are porous enough to allow a certain degree of
mobilization").
159 Mutua, above n.140, 852.
160 Bull, above n.127, 315.
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structurally and substantively more inhospitable to its message than the system
faced by developing-country international lawyers in the period of
decolonization. TWAIL conclusions that the decolonization effort to de-center
and re-conceptualize international law failed to leave lasting marks on
international law's development haunt TWAIL's much more difficult quest
today for a post-hegemonic global order.
